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ABSTRACT
This study uses the modified Gompertz model and sparse data to analyze the growth rates of
different types of computer and Internet-related crimes. The Gompertz model is an appropriate
diffusion model because it is capable of modeling two opposite behaviors: (1) acts of attacks and
imitation of attacks and (2) deterrence acts to prevent such attacks. In addition, this model can
handle sparse data adequately. The model was used to analyze various types of attacks. The
results indicated that growth patterns of computer and Internet crimes differ in growth patterns
and that a relationship exists between occurrences of such security breaches and uses of certain
security technologies. Thus, for example, financial fraud and denial of service are growing at a
faster pace. The study also found, for example, that an increase in virus-related incidents does
not necessarily increase anti-virus software use.
Keywords: Computer and Internet security breaches, Gompertz model, diffusion model, bad
innovation, types of crimes, growth patterns of crimes
I. INTRODUCTION
Computer and Internet-related crimes show no signs of abatement. A 2003 survey conducted by
the CSI/FBI reports that 75% of surveyed firms and agencies detected computer security
breaches and acknowledged financial losses as a result of computer breaches [Power, 2003].
CERT/CC [2003] reports computer security vulnerabilities nearly doubled in 2002 with 2437
separate holes reported in 2001 and 4129 reported in 2002. Following the same trends, the
number of reported incidents also increased significantly with 52,658 documented in 2001 and
82,694 in 2002. Through the continual monitoring of hundreds of Fortune 1000 companies,
Riptech found that general Internet attack trends are showing a 64% annual rate of growth
[http://www.riptech.com].
Neumann [1999] states that costs of cyber crime are difficult to measure; however, these costs
are reasonably substantial and growing rapidly. Garg et al. [2003] attempted to quantify the
financial impact of IT security breaches by using event-study methodology. They came to the
same conclusion: IT breaches are extremely costly. Lukasik [2000] claims that cyber crime costs
are essentially doubling each year. The problem becomes even more complicated when one
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considers that these crimes are underreported. Ullman and Ferrera, [1998] mention that,
according to FBI estimates, only 17 percent of computer crimes are reported to government
authorities.
Previous studies that focused on computer or information systems security issues lack empirical
results on how different these security breaches are from one another and what their growth
patterns are. Such empirical studies are important because some attacks enormously and rapidly
disrupt the Internet infrastructure for a length of time, thus resulting in millions of dollars in losses.
For example, the “Code Red Worm” virus infected more than 250,000 systems around the globe
in nine hours on July 19, 2001, and its estimated total global economic impact was as much as
$2.6 billion [Householder et al., 2002].
The growth of computer and Internet security breaches can be studied from an innovation
diffusion perspective [Rogers, 2003]. Innovation diffusion literature is usually concerned with
good innovations and thus biased towards good innovations. The study of bad innovations such
as security attacks can alert readers to the fact that innovations are not always good and what
actions need to be taken to prevent such bad innovations. The present study uses the concept of
bad innovations by using the modified Gompertz model [Pitcher et al., 1978] which is capable of
capturing attack incidences as well as deterrent activities. Based on past experiences, it can be
inferred that not all attacks deserve the same attention and not all attacks may show the same
type of growth rate. It is important to know how these various crime rates are growing. This
question needs to be investigated empirically. Although estimation with a sparse set of data at an
earlier stage of growth is challenging, past studies proved it to be useful. In this paper, we focus
on different types of attacks, how these evolved, whether different types of attacks evolved
similarly, and how deterrence effects are working.
The study is preliminary in nature for a number of reasons. Literature is almost non-existent on
this topic. Data on different types of security breaches are sparse [Power, 2002]. One of the most
referenced studies of security breaches, the CSI/FBI computer crime and security survey by
Richard Power, contains only a few years of recent data [1996-2002]. Modeling such security
breaches during the early stages of data availability is difficult but extremely critical. Analysis with
sparse data is, however, not uncommon in research literature. For example, marketing literature
reports the forecasting of sales of new products with as few as five years of data [Mahajan and
Peterson, 1985]. The dynamic behavior of hundreds of good innovations shows similar
characteristics during the early phases of growth as observed across many types of products
[Bass, 1969; Mahajan et al., 1985; Jepson, 1976]. Previous works on forecasting from early data
with a small number of data points include Lawton and Lawton [1979], Tigert and Farivar [1981],
Kalish and Lilien [1986], Wright, Uprichard and Lewis [1997]. Lilien et al. [1981] and Dalal et al.
[1998] updated parameter estimates for a new product by using data on similar products or expert
judgment in a Bayesian framework. Sultan et al.[1990] used meta-analysis-based prior
information with a few data points on a new product to obtain more robust posterior estimates.
In the absence of prior information and data on Internet attacks, we use traditional diffusion
models. Previous research reports that the shape of sales curves of many innovative products
during the growth phase is similar [Mahajan et al., 1985]. Sales of new products in the early
phases tend to grow extremely rapidly. This high growth rate tends to decrease over time and
finally the diffusion matures and tapers off, as newer technologies replace older ones. Previous
research also found that while exponential or logistic curves are adequate for modeling purposes
in the growth phase, they are not adequate to model many innovations at an earlier stage. A
small error at an early stage can result in a large effect on later time period forecasts [Martino,
1972].
Modified Gompertz curves, such as the General Sales Growth Curve [Lieb Associates, 2001], are
reported which describe the data well and yield good curve fitting and forecasting of new
innovations in the early growth phases [Jepson, 1976; Lakhani, 1979]. The Gompertz curve could
be a good fit for innovations which rapidly increase in the beginning and then taper off slowly. The
point of inflection of the growth curve occurs at 33% of total potential diffusion. Such a model is
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used in the present study of bad innovations [Pitcher et al., 1978]. In addition, the model’s
explanatory power helps to understand how these attacks are developing and what factors are
behind such attacks.
II. TYPES OF BREACHES
Some of the important security breaches since 2001 are the results of the following attacks
[CERT/CC, 2003]:
•

Multiple vulnerabilities in the Internet Software Consortium's Berkeley Internet Name
Domain (BIND) server,

•

Sadmind/IIS worm (a worm that exploits a vulnerability in Solaris systems and
subsequently installs software to attack Microsoft IIS web servers),

•

Code Red worm (a self-propagating malicious code that exploits IIS-enabled systems),

•

SirCam worm (a malicious code that spreads through email and potentially through
unprotected network shares), and

•

Nimda blended threat (a combination of worm, viruses, and other codes that propagates
itself via several methods, including email, network shares, or through an infected web
site).

Security breaching techniques have come a long way from early hacker-induced attacks of
1970s. Sophisticated attacks include superior software techniques that are increasingly difficult to
separate from normal network traffic. An automated sophisticated attack may typically consist of
four phases:
1. scanning for potential victims,
2. compromising vulnerable systems,
3. propagating the attack, and
4. coordinated management of attack tools [Householder et al., 2002].
To increase attack efficiency, scanning and attack tools are integrated and attack cycles are
initiated automatically. Distributed attack tools are common.
The main types of reported popular Internet-based attacks are [Denning, 1999; Smith and Rupp,
2002; Ratnasingam, 2002; McCroham, 2003]:
•

denial of service

•

domain name system

•

worm and virus

•

router attacks

•

web defacement

The denial of service attack prevents legitimate users from using the service, typically by flooding
a network or disrupting connections or services. An example is the Mafia Boy attack from
February 7-9, 2000 on web sites such as Yahoo.com, CNN.com, and Amazon.com. The web
sites went out of service for more than two hours costing $1.2 billion in loss in business [CCITS,
2002].
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A worm is a self-propagating malicious piece of code and is highly automated. A recent example
of a worm is the “Blaster” or “Sobig” worm which affected over 500,000 computers in September
2003 [Krebs, 2003]. Top-level domain servers are potentially vulnerable and any attack on them
can cause widespread problems.
Some viruses can be spread by executing infected programs. An example of a destructive virus is
“I love you,” which appeared in May 2000, took five hours to spread, and cost some $10 billion in
damages and lost productivity [CCITS, 2002]. Sometimes, when an infected program runs, it may
wipe out the hard disk and do other damages.
Routers, which are devices used to direct traffic on a network, can be attacked in several ways
such as by denial of service or by using the router as an attack platform. It is no surprise that
many corporate network professionals cite e-mail parasites (62%) and spam (17%) as the two
most damaging types of external security attacks.
The CSI/FBI report [2002] talks about many other types of computer and Internet-based attacks
or misuses such as financial and telecom fraud, telecom eavesdropping, sabotage, laptop
misuse, active wiretap, and insider abuse of net access. Web defacement is treated as a
separate type of attack because of its importance and recent frequency (more than 50 a day in
2002, [CTNEWS, 2002]. Reasons for web defacement include electronic graffiti, attention
seeking, and intellectual challenge. Domains such as .gov, .mil, .com are frequently targeted for
web defacement attacks. Mirror web sites such as Alldas.de, attrition.org, and safemode.org
chronicled this phenomenon and were also closed down by hacker attacks.
III. SECURITY BREACH DETERRENT TOOLS AND TECHNIQUES
As security breaching techniques refine, so also do security attack detection and prevention
techniques. Several tools are available to firms to combat security attacks. Firewalls, placed
between the company network and the Internet, provide ongoing protection by denying
suspicious traffic. Another system, called the intrusion detection system (IDS), is needed to
inform companies when they are under attack. The IDS examines all packets and prepares a log
file. The security administrator examines the log file to look for suspicious patterns and generates
messages for possible attacks. If an attack packet passes through the firewall, the next line of
defense is to prepare the host from possible attacks by installing vendor-specific current patches
for known weaknesses in the system. A large number of attacks emerge from known
weaknesses in popular software. Security systems are also designed to prevent eavesdropping
attacks. Secure communication is ensured when the checks for authenticity, integrity and
confidentiality are maintained. Many techniques such as biometrics, digital IDs, encrypted logins,
anti-virus software, and access control mechanism are used to prevent attacks [Power, 2002].
Not all of them are universally effective or popular.
Sometimes, an attacker succeeds by breaking all systems. This situation is called a security
incident. Companies need to plan for incident handling (also called incident response). A good
plan will detail how to stop the attacks, restore the system to its pre-attack state, and how to
document that attack for future prosecution. In case a firm’s security administration fails, Internet
security sites can provide help. Organizations such as CSI, CERT, NIPC, and the IEEE task
force on security and privacy [IEEE, 2002], make enormous deterrence efforts to stop hacking
that maliciously damages academic, government, and business activities.
The security infrastructure and security providers no doubt act as a deterrent to attempts of such
breaches by sustained organized efforts. Security laws and regulations of a nation also help the
deterrent side of the equation. Some U.S. government regulations are already in place. These
regulations are related to computers, access devices and communication lines, stations, and
systems. For example, the computer fraud and abuse statute 1030 states that if anyone
knowingly or intentionally accesses a computer without authorization or exceeds authorized
access, he/she is liable to be punished [NSI, 2002]. International efforts are also not lacking.
Forty-one European countries, plus the U.S., Canada and Japan, attended a recent convention
An Analysis of the Growth of Computer and Internet Security Breaches by K. Bagchi and G. Udo

688

Communications of the Association for Information Systems (Volume 12, 2003) 684-700

on cyber crime. These nations signed a treaty that supplies a legal framework aimed at protecting
society against cyber crime [Conventions, 2002].
IV. A MODEL OF SECURITY BREACHES/ATTACKS
Many researchers have studied Computer/IS security issues [Atkins, 1996; Parker, 1983; Straub,
1990]. Straub and his coworkers used general deterrence theory in the IS environment [Straub,
Carlson, and Jones, 1993; Straub, 1990; Straub and Welke, 1998]. The basic argument in this
body of work is that information security actions can deter potential computer abusers from
committing illegal acts. They also found empirical evidence that security actions can lower
systems risk.
Arquilla [2001] argues that the information revolution favors the rise of network forms of
organization to redefine societies, and in so doing invites the duel between conflict and
cooperation. The term ‘netwar’ calls attention to the prospect that network-based conflict and
crime will be major phenomena in the years ahead. Arquilla thinks that the spread of the network
form and its technologies is clearly bringing some new risks and dangers. It can be used to
generate threats to freedom and privacy. New methods for surveillance, monitoring, and tracking
are being developed.
Mostly though, previous studies lack empirical results on how different types of attacks grow or
provide reliable models of such attack growths. This understanding is important. Some attacks
enormously and rapidly disrupt the Internet infrastructure for a length of time, thus resulting in
millions of lost dollars. For example, the infamous "Melissa" virus in 1999 infected thousands of
computers with rapid speed, causing an estimated $80 million in damages [CCITS, 2002].
The growth process can be studied from an innovation diffusion perspective [Rogers, 1991]. The
four main elements in the diffusion process are:
1. the innovation (good or bad),
2. channels of communication,
3. time, and
4. the social system.
In the present case, examples of channels could be direct word-of-mouth or contacts made via
the Internet/Web. Timer relate to the rate at which the innovation is diffused, and the social
system is the system of all potential and existing attackers.
Ideally, a growth model is needed that can capture both deterrence and imitation activities to
model the security breaching incidents. However, traditional diffusion models do not provide the
necessary explanatory power to analyze the attack phenomenon adequately [Mahajan and
Peterson, 1985].
V. THE GOMPERTZ MODEL
The modified Gompertz model used by Pitcher et al. [978] assumes that the probable causes for
the outbreak of such incidents are imitative as well as inhibitive in nature. This model’s
theoretical background is strong and is based on a social conflict theory. The imitative aspect is
based on incident news spread via the Internet and by word-of-mouth; the inhibitive aspects can
also be spread via Internet/Web sites and related stories. However, people only engage in
security attacks when they feel threatened or are motivated by some economic or other gain and
observed the success of earlier attackers [Bandura, 1986]. Traditionally, the challenge or threat to
such attackers was mostly an intellectual one: to break a system. To quote a hacker expert,
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“It's the sheer challenge (to crack a code or break a system) rather than any
(criminal intent). They see it as an intellectual challenge and a prize, (and) they
look at the success of what they have done rather than the consequences of the
lives of people they have affected” [Dreyfus, 2002].
Of course, other types of challenges come, for instance, from making money or taking economic
or political advantage. The more successful the earlier attackers are, the more aggressive the
behavior of the present attacker becomes. Each such incident is an imitation of previous behavior
and a behavioral model for others to imitate. On the other hand, the increase of security activities
and success stories about preventing such attacks could reduce the number of attacks. Thus, a
combination of imitation and inhibition as assumed by the asymmetric model could provide a
realistic background in modeling such incidents.
The model can be expressed as:

dN (t )
= c ⋅ e − qt ⋅ N (t )
dt
where t = time,
N (t) = cumulative number of attack incidents at time t
c, q are parameters of the models.
The parameter c denotes the net rate of instigation to attacks and q denotes the rate
of inhibition in such attacks.
We model the growth process as a combination of attack influences as well as preventive efforts
by various agencies to curb such incidents. Our analysis suggests that the growth was indeed
influenced by a combination of factors: attacks by like-minded peers (hackers or crackers) and
attack-preventive measures put forward by various governments, academic, and security
agencies. The implications of the results affect everyone - from security professionals and
merchants associated with on-line trade over the Internet to academics, professionals, and other
day-to-day users of the Internet/Web.
VI. PROPOSITION FORMULATION
Although imitative and deterrence acts constitute the background of any attack scenario, the rates
of imitation and deterrence may not be the same. When the rate of instigation increases it may
mean an overall increase in deterrence rate as more and more security products will be
developed. As these products come onto the market, attackers find ways to bypass these
products and refine their attacks, which in turn leads to more refined security products. This cycle
of reinforcing attack and deterrence continues [Pitcher et al., 1978].
Proposition 1: Relative increase in net instigation rate is related to relative increase in
deterrence rate.
Sofaer and Goodman [2001], observe that
“the risks of cyber terrorism and cyber crime vastly outweigh our abilities to
control those risks by technological means, although technology can help and
should be vigorously pursued.”
Thus, preventive measures are assumed to be thoroughly outweighed by attacks. Therefore, it is
expected that the value of c, the net rate of instigation will be much higher than the value of q, the
rate of deterrence or inhibition.
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Proposition 2: Values of the net rate of instigation, c, will be much higher than values of q, the
rate of inhibition for computer and Internet-related bad innovations, i.e., digital crimes and security
breaches.
Although reported computer crimes are of many types, not all of them are equally popular, due to
economic, political, technical and a variety of other reasons. At the beginning, hacking was done
primarily for intellectual satisfaction, to break a system. In recent times however, financial profit
considerations are one of the main reasons for computer crimes. Thus, losses in 2002 because of
financial fraud and theft of proprietary information far surpass any other type of loss [Power,
2002]. Virus and insider net abuse still continue to cause concern and denial of service and
system penetration incidents are rising rapidly. Laptop theft incidents decreased in recent years.
It is expected, therefore, that the growth rates of crime technologies will differ by crime types.
Proposition 3: Not all computer crimes and security breaches show similar growth rates.
Security tools or defensive cyber weapons include encryption, authentication, access controls,
firewalls, anti-viral software, audit tools, and intrusion detection systems [Denning, 2000].
Although new security tools are being developed (for example, biometrics and digital IDs) and
security technologies are increasingly used by many firms, it is useful to investigate whether and
how usage is related to attacks that occur. Thus, denial of service attacks, proprietary information
theft, and system penetration attacks should lead to more use of intruder detection software,
encryption, and firewalls; virus attacks should lead to more antivirus software use and encryption.
Proposition 4: The more security incidents happen, the more security technologies are used.
In particular,
4a. system penetration attacks should lead to more use of intruder detection software,
encryption, and firewalls
4b. denial of service attacks should lead to more use of intruder detection software,
encryption, and firewall
4c. proprietary information theft should lead to more use of intruder detection software,
encryption, and firewalls
4d. virus attacks should lead to more antivirus software use and encryption use.
VII. DATA ANALYSIS AND METHOD
Power [2002] gathered data on aspects of cyber crime from 1997 onwards. The survey, called the
“Annual CSI/FBI Computer Crime and Security Survey,” gathers data based on a survey
questionnaire sent to information security practitioners in U.S. organizations. The statistical rigor
of the survey findings is sound [Richardson, 2003]. The same survey was used for all years and
the respondents are mostly security professionals with firms who are better-informed about the
attacks than others. This data set is used for the present study. We used total annual loss data
which was available in U.S. dollar value. We decided to use the annual financial loss data
because it would reflect the most accurate situation in terms of extent of financial damages
incurred by firms by such attacks. The financial loss data were converted to 1996 U.S. dollar
1
value by dividing by the price deflator for each year.
For the 2002 survey, questionnaires were distributed to 3,500 information security professionals
with a 14% response. The responses were anonymous. Job titles of respondents ranged from
1

Alternatively, the 1996 numbers (first quarter) can be multiplied by 1.126 to show values in 2003 (first
quarter) or multiplied by 1.108 to show values in 2002 (first quarter).
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corporate information security manager and data security officer to senior systems analyst.
Organizations surveyed included corporations, financial institutions, government agencies and
universities. Total dollar losses as listed in several years are shown in Table 1. In terms of dollar
value, theft of proprietary information and financial fraud caused the greatest financial losses.
Table 1. Total Dollar Losses (in millions) per Year
From Digital Crimes as Reported by Respondents
Year

No. of

Amount in US

Respondents with

$ Value

Losses
1997

249

100,119,555

1998

241

136,822,000

1999

163

123,779,000

2000

273

265,337,990

2001

196

377,828,700

2002

n/a

455,848,000

251

201,797,340

2003
Source: [Richardson 2003]

Table 2 shows the distribution of the respondents who reported attacks by industry sectors for
2000 and 2003. The distribution did not change much over the four year period.

Table 2. Distribution of Respondents Reporting Attacks
by Industry Sectors
Industry Sector
State Govt.
Local Govt.
Federal Govt.
Education
Retail

%(Year 2000)
7
2
9
5
4

% (Year 2003)
5
3
7
5
3

Industry Sector
Transportation
Telecom
Financial
Manufacturing
Utility

%(Year 2000)
2
4
17
10
4

% (Year 2003)
1
4
15
11
4

Medical

7

8

Legal

--

1

High-tech

17

17

Other
Total

12
100

17
100

Source: [Richardson 2003]

For web-defacement, we use monthly defacement incident data available from January 1997 to
July 2001, based on a report by Attrition, a mirroring firm, [Attrition, 2001]. Attrition began actively
mirroring defaced sites since 1995. However, it had to close down in 2002, due to hacker attacks.
Sample data from web defacement are shown in Table 3.
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Table 3. Sample of Monthly Web Defacement Incidents
from 1995-2001
Month/Year

No of incidents

November 1995

1

November 1996

6

November 1997

2

November 1998

35

November 1999

665

November 2000

722

May

2001

Grand Total (1995-2001)
Source: www.attrition.org

1137
15203

The data analysis method used in this paper is a non-linear least square regression scheme. We
used SPSS to design and run the non-linear model described above, with different sets of data.
Non-linear equations are sometimes known to be difficult to converge. The convergence problem
is handled with suitable initial values of parameters. The Levenberg-Marquardt algorithm [SPSS,
2003] is mostly used to determine parameter values of interest, q and c here. In a few cases, we
needed to constrain the parameter values to obtain a solution.
VIII. RESULTS
Proposition1. Relative increase in net instigation rate is related to relative increase in inhibition
rate. Figure 1 shows the result for Proposition 1. The break-even line in the figure shows that
there is no point above the line, thus showing that net instigation rates are always higher than the
inhibition rates. The figure captures the fit of the power function of the relationship between q and
2.19)
c. The function is: q = .089c(
(R2 = .66). An increase in net instigation rate is greater than the
corresponding relative increase in inhibition rate. This result is consistent with results obtained
from other types of crimes [Pitcher et al., 1978]. The moderate fit and the positive value of c
support Proposition 1.
Proposition 2. Values of net instigation rate, c, will be much higher than values of inhibition rate,
q, for computer and Internet-related bad innovations, i.e., computer crimes and security breaches.
Table 4 presents results from running the model for various types of computer crimes and
security breaches. The R2 value from the model fits are high (.80-.99). The values of q and c are
different, for each type of security breach, with values of c much higher than q. When c> q,
overall impact of net instigation is more than the inhibition rate and vice versa. The results are
again consistent with the results obtained from other types of crimes [Pitcher et al., 1978].
Proposition 2 is confirmed.
Proposition 3. Not all computer crimes and security breaches show similar growth rates. The
results are shown in Table 4. The pair of values of q and c, as obtained from each run, is very
different for each type of crimes, thus confirming Proposition 3. Of these viruses, financial fraud,
and theft of proprietary information are projected to be significant and costly in the near future.
Denial of service is rising rapidly. Telecom fraud, active wiretapping, laptop theft, and
unauthorized insider access will be lower. By comparison, the rest of the crimes are projected to
be at a moderate level of intensity.
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2.5

Inhibition Rate

2

1.5
q
fit

1

0.5

0

0

0.5

1

1.5

2
2.5
3
Net Instigation Rate

3.5

4

Figure 1. Inhibition Rate (q) vs. the Net Instigation Rate (c)

Table 4. q and c Values from the Model of Various Attack Types
Items

Theft of proprietary info.
Sabotage of data of networks
Insider abuse of Net access
Financial fraud
Denial of service
Virus
Unauthorized insider access
Telecom fraud
Active wiretapping
Laptop theft
1
unit is number of incidents

Upper limit
cumulative
cost
5.9E+09
2.6E+09
9E+08
1.02E+13
2.79E+08
3.42E+16
7.75E+07
5E+07
2.3E+07
8.8E+07

R2

0.99
0.95
0.99
0.99
0.99
0.98
0.89
0.94
0.80
0.99

q

0.1555
0.1117
0.245
0.046
0.191
0.024
0.693
0.79
0.348
0.331

C

1.029
.8208
2.13
.626
1.07
.544
4.24
1.403
2.41
1.255
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Proposition 4. The more attack incidents happen, the more security technologies are used. The
results are shown in Table 5. Limited support is found for propositions 4a-4c; whereas proposition
4d is falsified.
As Table 5 indicates, more denial of service and system penetration attacks increase use of
encryption and intrusion detection software. More financial frauds and theft of proprietary
information lead to increase in anti-virus software and firewall use. However, unexpectedly, an
increase in virus-related incidents does not increase anti-virus software or other security software
use. Power [2002] reported that although 90% of respondents used anti-virus software, 85% of
them were affected by virus, worm, and other attackers. Inadequacy of existing software in
combating viruses is evident to managers, as viruses always come in newer forms. More
research is needed on this issue.
Table 5. Pearson Correlation Coefficients and Standard Deviations for Security Tools/Techniques
and Attack Types
Security Technologies Used by US Firms (1998-2002)
Types of Attacks
or Misuse Detected

Measure

Denial of Service

Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)

Financial Fraud

System
Penetration

Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)

Theft of Proprietary
Info

Virus

Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)

% Antivirus
Software Used

% Intrusion
Detection
Software Used
.973

% Encrypted
Login Used

% Firewalls Used

.953

.635

.816
(N.S)
.854

.005**

.012*

-.450

-.287

.250
(N.S)
.482

.065

.447
(N.S)
.985

.639
(N.S)
.953

.411
(N.S)
.675

.743
(N.S)
.833

.002**

.012*

.381

.609

.211
(N.S)
.884

.08***

.275
(N.S)
.671

.047*

.365

.526
(N.S)
.481

.546
(N.S)

.412
(N.S)

.215
(N.S)

.354
(N.S)

.145

.204

.534

N.S—Not significant; * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).; *** Correlation is significant at the 0.1 level
(2-tailed)
IX. DISCUSSION
How robust is the model fit using the sparse data model (Gompertz in the present study)? We
could check only for Web defacement cases, as it had enough monthly data for forecasting
purpose. Monthly data are more susceptible to fluctuations than yearly data. We used 12 data
points for building the model (starting from July 1998, as early data were not contiguous) and 12
successive data points for prediction, using the Gompertz model. Figure 2 shows the results.
As shown in Table 6, for the first 12 forecasts, predicted value exceeded (in three cases) 50% of
the actual value. Thus, 30% of forecasts were off by more than 50% (refer to the last column of
the table). The average error for the 12-month forecast was 32% and the maximum error in
forecast during this time frame was 74%. Predictions up to 11 more months could be observed
(i.e., up to the end of available data) in which predictions exceeding 75% greater than actual
values (but less than100%) were 10 in number, or roughly 44% of total number of predictions.
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Figure 2. The Web Defacement Data and Predictions from the Gompertz Model
Table 6. Sample Web Defacement Data and Sparse Model-Based Forecasts
Forecast
No.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12

Actual
Incidents
(Cumulative)
1762
2088
2346
2843
3508
3920
4345
4740
5203
5559
5968
6347

Gompertz
Forecast
1716
2171
2703
3315
4009
4786
5645
6583
7596
8680
9829
11036
Average
Error (%)

Forecast/
Actual
0.97
1.04
1.15
1.17
1.14
1.22
1.30
1.39
1.46
1.56
1.65
1.74
32%

Forecast
No.
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23

Actual
Incidents
(Cumulative)
6746
7288
7764
8337
9059
9742
10639
11487
12374
13920
15057

Gompertz
Forecast
12293
13592
14926
16286
17665
19054
20446
21835
23213
24575
25915

Forecast/
Actual
1.82
1.87
1.92
1.95
1.95
1.96
1.92
1.90
1.88
1.77
1.72

Note: Forecast 1 is for July 1999; Forecast 23 is for May 2001
These results confirm that the Gompertz model is adequate for short term predictions of web
defacement incidents.
The exponential or the logistic models performed much worse, when compared with the Gomperz
model, as shown in Table 7. Figure 3 graphically shows how the logistic model overestimates the
data compared to the Gompertz model in the present case. Although the logistic model performed
better than the exponential model, neither model was a good fit 2.

2

We assumed the upper bound of the logistic model as 100,000 which is a little more than six times the last
cumulative actual value (as obtained in May 2001). This is a conservative, low assumption as the actual
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Table 7. Sample Web Defacement Data and Fits
Time
(in Months)
(July 1998)

Actual
Cumulative
Incidents
1
2
3
4
5

...
30
31
32
33
34
(May 2001) 35

12
37
63
83
118
..
9742
10639
11487
12374
13920
15057

Sparse Model/
Gompertz
17
29
48
78
121
..
19054
20446
21835
23213
24575
25915

Exponential
Model

Logistic Model

22
32
48
71
105
..
1958410
2901758
4299509
6370544
9439177
13985944

22
32
48
71
106
..
95283
96771
97800
98506
98988
99316

120000

Actual, Logistic and Gompertz Fits

100000

80000

Time in Months
Actual
Sparse Model Fit
Logistic Fit

60000

40000

20000

0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35
Time in Months

Figure 3. A Comparison of Logistic and Gompertz Fits For the Web Defacement Data

To verify this phenomenon for other types of attacks, we calculated absolute sum of errors based
on the fits obtained from logistic, exponential and Gompertz models for all attack types. The

growth registered has been more than 1200 times the initial starting value in July 1998 (i.e., see Table 7).
Higher values of upper bound may lead to higher errors in estimates and lower values may be impractical.
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results are shown in Table 8. The Gompertz model provides superior fits for this class of models
in all but two cases.
Table 8. The Fits from Competing Models
Rank of Absolute Sum of Errors
Items

Gompertz

Logistic

Exponential

Theft of proprietary
2
1
3
info.
Sabotage of data
1
2
3
of networks
Telecom
1
3
2
eavesdropping
Insider abuse of
1
3
2
Net access
Financial fraud
1
2
3
Denial of service
1
2
3
Virus
1
2
3
Unauthorized
1
3
2
insider access
Telecom fraud
1
2
3
Active wiretapping
3
1
2
Laptop theft
1
2
3
Web defacement
1
2
3
Note. Absolute sum of errors is ranked 1, 2 or 3 based on minimum values

Model That Provides
the Best Fit
Logistic
Gompertz
Gompertz
Gompertz
Gompertz
Gompertz
Gompertz
Gompertz
Gompertz
Logistic
Gompertz
Gompetrz

X. CONCLUSIONS
Of the four propositions explored in this study, three (Propositions 1-3) were strongly confirmed
while the remaining one (Proposition 4) was partially confirmed. In summary, the results of this
study led us to conclude that:
•
•

Relative increase in net instigation rate is related to relative increase in inhibition rate
which implies that the increasing attack incidences will force organizations and
governments to come up with means of preventing or reducing them;
For computer and Internet-related attacks (bad innovations), the values of net instigation
rate is higher than values of inhibition rate, implying more efforts and resources need to
be applied toward inhibiting attacks;

•

Different computer crimes and security breaches grow at different rates, which implies
that all these crimes should not receive the same level of attention because some crimes
are likely to spread more rapidly than others;

•

Real world practice does not always follow the common notion that as more attack
incidents occur, more security technologies are used. This finding may imply that
organizations and governments do not necessarily spend money on security measures in
proportion to the frequency of attack incidences. Ninety percent of respondents in the
2002 survey, for example, used anti-virus software; however, at least 10-15% of
respondents did not detect any virus, due probably to non-use or ignorance [Power,
2002]. Viruses are among those attack incidents that caused financial losses.

This article is a first attempt to identify the nature of growth of various computer and Internetrelated crimes, using a sparse set of data. First, a model was selected for bad innovation
modeling which can represent both imitative and inhibitive behaviors in attacks. Next, the model
was used to derive and compare various types of attack statistics with a sparse set of data.
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Although the modified Gompertz model used is better than other forecasting models, it may still
yield forecast errors that can only be refined with the progress of time.
Future predictions can be richer if the underlying relationships of the regression model remain
unchanged. We did not use the data from 2003 as it trended downwards compared to the trend of
the overall set (1997-2002). Nonetheless, the results should be interpreted with caution.
However, our objective is to obtain and compare preliminary growth estimates of various attacks
and this paper indicates the different rates at which such crimes are growing.
Editor’s Note: This article was received on October 8, 2003 and was published on December 19,
2003. It was with the authors for three weeks for two revisions.
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